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The Cārvāka mindset
as it reappears in later Indian philosophy By Bodhangkur 1) Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa
(8th–9th c.): the closest heir in method Work: Tattvopaplava-siṃha (“The Lion that
Devastates All Principles”) What he
reprises ·
Systematic demolition of metaphysical foundations across
all schools (Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā,
Buddhism, etc.). ·
Epistemic scepticism: attacks
the very possibility of secure pramāṇas
(means of knowledge, including even perception). ·
Anti-transcendence posture: no
appeal to invisible entities as explanatory licenses. Where he
aligns with Cārvāka ·
Shares the “call their bluff” method:
force doctrines to specify their operational footing; when they can’t, expose
them as empty placeholders. ·
Continues the anti-priestcraft /
anti-authority impulse (no school gets a free pass). Where he
diverges ·
Jayarāśi is not a
positive materialist; he offers radical scepticism without a constructive
naturalist engine. ·
In Finn’s terms: Jayarāśi
perfects the demolition phase; he does not provide a constraint-grammar
ontology to replace what he demolishes. Verdict:
Methodological Cārvāka without Cārvāka’s minimal naturalism; Finn = Jayarāśi’s demolition plus a production
rule. 2) Ajńāna / “Sceptic” tendencies (earlier, but
echoed later in reception) Profile:
anti-metaphysical scepticism; refusal to affirm doctrinal claims about
afterlife, gods, or ultimate truths. What
reprises the mindset ·
Refusal of transcendence as knowable;
critique of metaphysical inflation. ·
Suspicion of doctrinal authority. Where it
falls short ·
Ajńāna scepticism is agnostic paralysis
rather than naturalist immanence. ·
No “nature is all we’ve got”; rather “we can’t
know.” Verdict: Shares the
veto on transcendence-talk; lacks Finn/Cārvāka’s
immanent replacement. 3) Nāgārjuna & Madhyamaka (2nd–3rd c.; later Buddhist receptions) What
looks similar ·
Relentless deconstruction of metaphysical
reification (svabhāva as
incoherent). ·
Anti-essentialism and
critique of explanatory absolutes. Where it
diverges sharply ·
Madhyamaka is not
naturalist and not materialist. ·
It does not land in “nature is all we’ve got,”
but in emptiness as a therapeutic dismantling of reification. Verdict: Shares
Finn/Cārvāka’s allergy to hypostatised explanations, but refuses to settle in immanence.
It dissolves ontologies; Finn replaces them with a machine. 4) Śrīharṣa
(12th c.) and later Advaita polemicists What
reprises the mindset ·
Epistemic and metaphysical critique of rival
systems (notably Nyāya). ·
Sophisticated methodological scepticism
about foundational claims. Where it
diverges ·
The demolition is in service of non-dualist
transcendence. ·
This is the opposite direction of Finn/Cārvāka: scepticism is used to clear space
for transcendence, not to ban it. Verdict: Same
weapon (critique), opposite target (reinstates transcendence). 5) Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila)
— partial, but not a reprise What
looks similar ·
Hard-nosed anti-theism in certain
arguments; strong this-worldly ritualism. ·
Refusal to ground ritual in a creator-god. Where it
diverges ·
Mīmāṃsā doubles
down on Vedic authority and ritual efficacy. ·
This is precisely what Cārvāka
attacks as priestly livelihood tech. Verdict:
Anti-theistic without being anti-ritual; not a Cārvāka
reprise. 6) Jain and Buddhist polemics against priestcraft What
reprises the mindset ·
Persistent critique of Brahminical authority
and ritual economy. ·
Emphasis on immanent causality (karma) rather
than creator-gods. Where
they diverge ·
They retain transcendent or trans-empirical
commitments (karmic continuation, liberation, nirvāṇa). ·
Hence they
fail the Cārvāka/Finn veto on
otherworldly accounting. Verdict: Social
critique overlaps; metaphysical stance does not. Synthesis: Who really reprises the Cārvāka
mindset? Closest
methodological heir: Jayarāśi
Bhaṭṭa ·
Same sceptical posture toward metaphysical
inflation. ·
Same refusal to grant explanatory credit to
transcendence. ·
Lacks Finn’s constructive engine. No later
school reprises full Cārvāka naturalism. Placement of Finn, the druid Finn
stands in the Cārvāka → Jayarāśi line of demystification, but adds
what neither supplies: ·
Cārvāka: o ✔ No transcendence o ✔ Priestcraft as livelihood
bluff o ✔ Nature suffices o ✖ No generative account of
emergence ·
Jayarāśi: o ✔ Maximal sceptical
demolition o ✖ No positive ontology at all ·
Finn (Procedure Monism): o ✔ No transcendence o ✔ Call the bluff of
priestcraft o ✔ Nature is all we’ve got
(“Nature is God”) o ✔ Plus: a constraint-grammar
engine explaining how nature produces identities, meanings, and
experiences without importing anything beyond immanence. Bottom
line: Greek
reprises of the Charvaka mindset |